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Toward Understanding the Psychology of Reactions
to Perceived Fairness: The Role of Affect Intensity
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In social psychology it has been argued that the importance of justice cannot be
overstated. In the present paper, we ask whether this indeed is the case and, more
precisely, examine when fairness is an important determinant of human reactions
and when it is less significant. To this end we explore what drives people’s reactions
to perceived fairness and argue that although social justice research has reported
effects of fairness perceptions on people’s affective feelings, a close examination
of the literature shows that these reactions appear less frequently and less strong
than one would expect. It is proposed here that this has to do with the neglect in
the social psychology of justice of an important determinant of affective reactions:
individuals’ propensity to react strongly or mildly toward affect-related events. As
hypothesized, findings of two empirical studies show that especially people high in
affect intensity show strong affective reactions following the experience of outcome
fairness (Study 1) and procedural fairness (Study 2). When affect intensity is low,
however, weak or no fairness effects were found, suggesting that then fairness may
not be an important issue. In the discussion it is thus argued that incorporating
affect intensity into the justice literature may further insights into the psychology
of reactions toward fairness.
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The norms and values of fairness and justice play a crucial role in social settings
and social behavior. Not surprisingly, therefore, the issue of social justice has
received considerable attention in recent years (for reviews, see, e.g., Cropanzano
and Greenberg, 1997; Folger and Cropanzano, 1998; Lind and Tyler, 1988). Social
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psychologists have shown that when people feel they have experienced fair or
unfair events this can have strong effects on their subsequent reactions (see, e.g.,
Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 1996; Folger and Cropanzano, 1998; Lind and Tyler,
1988; Tyler and Lind, 1992). For example, it has been shown that people who feel
they have been treated fairly by their organization and by the people who work in the
organization indicate higher levels of commitment to the organization and more
extra-role citizenship behavior (see, e.g., Folger and Cropanzano, 1998; Folger
and Konovsky, 1989; Korsgaard, Schweiger, and Sapienza, 1995; McFarlin and
Sweeney, 1992). People who have been experiencing unfair treatment, on the other
hand, are more likely to leave their jobs, show lower levels of commitment, and
may even start behaving in antinormative ways (Greenberg, 1993, 1997; Greenberg
and Lind, 2000).
These and other findings suggest that people’s reactions to perceived fairness
play a crucial role in social behavior. Folger (1984) has even noted that “the
importance of justice cannot be overstated” (p. ix). In this paper, however, we
ask whether this indeed is the case: Can the importance of justice really not be
overstated? Or, to take a more social psychological perspective on this matter,
when is fairness an important determinant of human reactions and when is it less
significant? To this end we explore what drives people’s reactions to perceived
fairness.
An illustration of the effects that perceived fairness can have on people’s
reactions can be found in studies in which it is varied whether people receive an
outcome that is either equal to the outcome of a comparable other person or that
is worse than the outcome of the comparison other (e.g., Adams, 1965; Van den
Bos, 1999). Results of these kinds of studies typically show that outcomes are
judged to be more fair when one’s own outcomes are equal to as opposed to worse
than the other person’s outcome. More important for the current purposes, findings
have revealed fair outcome effects. For example, people are more inclined to try
to resolve conflicts after having experienced fair as opposed to unfair outcomes
(e.g., Folger and Cropanzano, 1998).
An alternative way to study people’s reactions to perceived fairness is to vary
that people either are or are not allowed an opportunity to voice their opinion
about decisions to be made (e.g., Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, and Corkran, 1979;
Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, and Wilke, 1997). These studies generally reveal that
people judge a voice procedure to be more fair than a no-voice procedure. More
interestingly, findings frequently show fair process effects. For instance, people
who have experienced fair procedures are less likely to protest than those who
have experienced unfair procedures (e.g., Lind and Tyler, 1988).
As argued convincingly by Weiss, Suckow, and Cropanzano (1999),
Cropanzano, Weiss, Suckow, and Grandey (2000), and Krehbiel and Cropanzano
(2000), while fairness perceptions predict a variety of important reactions in the
workplace, a close examination of the literature shows that most of these reactions
are either attitudinal or behavioral reactions (see also Tyler and Smith, 1998, for a
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similar argument). Furthermore, these authors noted that although these types of
reactions are important, of course, a third class of reactions appears somewhat less
frequently: reactions on people’s affective feelings. Exploring affective reactions
is important because this may reveal that the psychology of fairness does not only
incorporate cognitions (e.g., perceptions of fairness), attitudes (e.g., inclination
to resolve conflicts), and behaviors (e.g., protest), but affect, emotion, and mood
as well.4 In this paper, therefore, we will investigate people’s affective reactions
following the experience of fair and unfair events.
To be sure, the research literature has reported some effects of fairness percep-
tions on people’s affective reactions. For example, research on moral transgression
has shown that severe injustices can lead to strong affective reactions (e.g., Folger
and Baron, 1996; Folger, Robinson, Dietz, Baron, and Mclean-Parks, 2001; Folger
and Skarlicki, 1998; Haidt, 2001, in press; Mikula, Scherer, and Athenstaedt, 1998;
Montada and Schneider, 1989; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, and Haidt, 1999). Related
to this, studies have found that fair and unfair events can affect discrete emotions
(Krehbiel and Cropanzano, 2000; Weiss et al., 1999) and our own research has
found effects of fairness manipulations on general ratings of affect (Van den Bos,
2001a; Van den Bos and Miedema, 2000; Vermunt, Wit, Van den Bos, and Lind,
1996). Furthermore, affect and related concepts have been important in work on
equity theory and experimental distributive justice (e.g., Adams, 1965), resentment
has been an important criterion in relative deprivation theory (e.g., Crosby, 1976),
and justice perceptions have been core elements in recent work on intergroup guilt
(e.g., Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead, 1998). However, unless trans-
gressions of justice and morality are very severe (Folger et al., 2001; Folger and
Baron, 1996; Folger and Skarlicki, 1998; Haidt, 2001, in press; Rozin et al., 1999)
or discrete emotions are tapped (Krehbiel and Cropanzano, 2000; Weiss et al.,
1999), it is our experience that it is not uncommon to find weak or no effects of
experiences of fair and unfair events on affective reactions (cf. Cropanzano et al.,
2000; Krehbiel and Cropanzano, 2000; Weiss et al., 1999). We propose here that
this has to do with the neglect in the social psychology of justice of an important
determinant of people’s affective reactions.
The affect literature has revealed that people can react more strongly or more
mildly toward affect-related events (e.g., Diener, Larsen, Levine, and Emmons,
1985). It has been shown that people differ consistently in the typical inten-
sity of their affective responses (e.g., Larsen and Diener, 1987; Larsen, Diener,
and Cropanzano, 1987; Larsen, Diener, and Emmons, 1986). When exposed to
affect-eliciting events, certain individuals consistently manifest stronger or more
4Although distinctions have been made between the concepts of affect, emotion, and mood, in the
present paper we are interested more in the similarities these concepts share, and—following Scherer
(1984), Gross (1998), and Frijda (1988)—we use the label affect as the superordinate category for
valenced stimuli, states, judgments, and behaviors, including emotions such as anger and sadness,
moods such as depression and euphoria, and judgments on dimensions such as favorability and
desirability.
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intense affective responses whereas other persons show milder or less intense
affective reactions. Larsen, Diener, and their colleagues have investigated this in-
dividual difference variable in both field and laboratory settings and showed that
the affect intensity dimension appears to generalize over positive and negative
affect domains (Larsen et al., 1987) and that individual differences in affect in-
tensity are stable over time and consistent across situations (Larsen and Diener,
1987).
In the justice literature, there has been a controversy whether justice judg-
ments should be thought of as subjective–affective constructs or as rational–
cognitive concepts (see Haidt, 2001; Van den Bos, 2002). If the justice concept
constitutes more of the former than of the latter, than it should be the case that
individual differences in affect intensity should play an important moderating role
in the psychology of people’s reactions toward fair and unfair events. Brockner
et al. (1998) have argued that “relatively few studies have investigated the moder-
ating role of theoretically derived, individual-difference variables” (p. 395; for an
important exception, however, see the work by Schmitt and others, e.g., Schmitt,
Eid, and Maes, 2003). We are arguing here that individuals’ propensity for affect
intensity is an important determinant of how people react toward fair and unfair
events and that incorporating the concept of affect intensity into the social justice
literature may, therefore, substantially further scientists’ insights into people’s re-
actions to fairness. In this way, our approach is in line with a dynamic interactionist
perspective (e.g., Schmitt et al., 2003; Snyder and Cantor, 1998), in which it is
argued that the interaction between personalities and situations may inform scien-
tists about the social aspects of the relations people encounter. That is, if different
types of personalities determine reactions to fair and unfair events this may inform
us about the nature of these events (see also Mischel, 1973). In this paper, we ex-
amine the role of affect intensity in people’s reactions to fair and unfair outcomes
(Study 1) as well as fair and unfair procedures (Study 2).
STUDY 1
As argued in the general introduction, it is not uncommon to find weak or no
effects on affective reactions following the experience of fair and unfair events. We
therefore attempted to set up our studies in such a way that finding the predicted
effects would be less unlikely: We used well-established experimental setups (Van
den Bos, 1999; Van den Bos et al., 1997); setups that have been shown to have good
levels of internal validity and experimental realism (Mook, 1983) and acceptable
levels of ecological validity (Lind and Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos and Lind,
2002). Furthermore, in these studies we assessed affective reactions by means of a
16-item scale that has been specifically constructed to measure people’s affective
reactions following the experience of fair and unfair events. Items of this scale
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have been used repeatedly and successfully in recent fairness studies (e.g., Van
den Bos, 2001a,b; Van den Bos and Lind, 2002; Van den Bos and Miedema, 2000;
Van den Bos and Spruijt, 2002; Van den Bos and Van Prooijen, 2001) and pilot
studies showed that, relative to other scales, this scale is better suited and more
susceptible for finding effects on people’s reactions following the experience of
fair and unfair events.
After people’s propensity for affect intensity had been assessed, they were
informed that they received an outcome that was equal to the outcome of a com-
parable other person or that was worse than the outcome of the comparison other
(cf. Adams, 1965; Van den Bos, 1999). Following this manipulation of outcome
fairness, people’s affective reactions were assessed. We expected that affect ratings
would be more positive when people had received an outcome that was equal to
as opposed to worse than the outcome of the comparable other person. More im-
portantly, following the line of reasoning presented in the general introduction, we
predicted this outcome effect to be stronger among people high in affect intensity
than among those low in affect intensity.
Method
Participants and design. Students at the Free University Amsterdam were
invited to participate in a study on human task performance. One hundred persons
(48 men and 52 women) participated in the study and were paid for their partic-
ipation. The design was a 2 (affect intensity: high vs. low) £ 2 (outcome: equal
to other vs. worse than other) between-subjects design. Participants were paid
10 Dutch guilders for their participation (1 Dutch guilder equaled approximately
U.S.$0.40 at the time the studies in this paper were conducted).
Experimental procedure. Participants were seated in separate rooms, each of
which contained a computer with a monitor and a keyboard, and were told that
the computers were connected to one another and that the supervisor of the study
could communicate with them by means of the computer network. The computers
were used to present the stimulus information and to collect data on the dependent
variables and the manipulation checks.
The experiment was presented to the participants as two separate studies. In
the first study, participants were asked to complete the Affect Intensity Measure
(e.g., Larsen et al., 1986, 1987), a 40-item questionnaire that inquires about the
strength of people’s affective reactions to typical life situations. Examples of items
are “When I accomplish something difficult I feel delighted or elated” and “When
I am nervous I get shaky all over.” Responses are given on 6-point scales (1 D
never, 6 D always). The Affect Intensity Measure has been validated in previous
studies (e.g., Larsen et al., 1986, 1987) and yielded a highly reliable scale in the
current study (fiD 0.89). Following Larsen et al. (1987), median splits were used to
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classify participants as high in affect intensity or low in affect intensity (MedianD
3.71, SD D 0.49).
After this, the second study started. Here we used a similar setup success-
fully used in previous fairness studies (e.g., Van den Bos, 1999; Van den Bos
et al., 1997) and that has been shown to combine high levels of internal validity
and experimental realism with acceptable levels of external validity (Lind and
Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos, 2001c; Van den Bos and Lind, 2002). In the
first part of the instructions, participants were informed that they participated in
the study with another person. The experimental procedure was then outlined to
the participants: After the tasks that participants were to complete would be ex-
plained, participants would practice the tasks for 2 min, after which time they
would work on the tasks for 10 min. Furthermore, participants were informed that,
after all participants were run, a lottery would be held among all participants. The
winner of this lottery would receive 100 Dutch guilders. (Actually, after all par-
ticipants had completed the experiment, the 100 Dutch guilders were randomly
given to one participant; a procedure to which none of the participants objected
upon debriefing). Participants were told that a total of 200 lottery tickets would
be divided among all participants. Furthermore, participants were told that af-
ter the work round the supervisor of the study would divide some lottery tickets
between them and the other participant. Seven practice questions were posed to
ensure comprehension of the lottery. If participants gave a wrong answer to a ques-
tion, the correct answer was disclosed and main characteristics of the lottery were
repeated.
The task was then explained to the participants. Figures would be presented
on the upper right part of the computer screen. Each figure consisted of 36 squares,
and each square showed one of eight distinct patterns. On the upper left side of
the computer screen one of the eight patterns would be presented, and participants
had to count the number of squares with this pattern in the figure on the right side
of the screen. When participants had indicated the correct number of patterns in
the figure on the right side of the screen, another figure and another pattern would
be presented on the screen. In both the practice round and the work round, the
number of tasks that the participant had completed (i.e., the number of figures that
the participant had counted) in the present round would be presented on the lower
right side of the screen. On the lower left side of the screen the time remaining in
the present round was shown.
The practice round then began, after which the work round began. After the
work round had ended, participants were told how many tasks they had completed
in the work round, and—to try to ensure that participants compared themselves to
the other participant—it was communicated to the participant that the other partic-
ipant had completed an equivalent number of tasks. To assess whether participants
thought of the other participant as a person who was comparable in the amounts of
inputs he or she provided (cf. Van den Bos, 1999; Van den Bos et al., 1997), they
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were asked to what extent the other participant had performed well in the work
round relative to the performance of the participant self (1 D much worse, 4 D
equally, 7 D much better) and to what extent the other participant did his/her best
in the work round relative to the participant self (1Dmuch worse, 4D equally, 7D
much better).
The outcome that participants received relative to the other participant was
then varied: Following Van den Bos (1999; Van den Bos et al., 1997), it was
communicated to the participants, by means of the computer network, that they
received three lottery tickets. Participants in the equal-to-other condition were
informed that the other participant received three tickets. Participants in the worse-
than-other condition were informed that the other participant received six tickets.
(In reality, however, all stimulus information was preprogrammed; a procedure to
which none of the participants objected upon debriefing.)
This was followed by the assessment of the dependent variables and the
manipulation checks. All ratings were made on 7-point scales. Main dependent
variables were participants’ affective reactions to experiences of fairness and un-
fairness, which were assessed by asking participants to respond to a 16-item scale
that has been specifically constructed—on the basis of items successfully used
in recent fairness studies (e.g., Van den Bos, 2001a,b; Van den Bos and Lind,
2002; Van den Bos and Miedema, 2000; Van den Bos and Spruijt, 2002; Van den
Bos and Van Prooijen, 2001)—to measure people’s affective reactions following
the experience of fair and unfair events: Participants were asked to what extent
they felt satisfied, happy, content, in a positive mood, proud, well, angry, furi-
ous, hostile, infuriated, in a negative mood, irritated, sad, disappointed, guilty,
and bad. All answers were given on 7-point scales (1 D very weak, 7 D very
strong). Positive and negative subscales of the scale typically are strongly in-
versely correlated (in this study: rD –0.59, p< 0.001) and therefore participants’
ratings were averaged to form a reliable scale of affective reactions toward fair-
ness of experience such that higher values denoting more positive ratings of affect
(fi D 0.75).
To check for the manipulation of outcome, participants were asked to what
extent they agreed with the statement that they received an equal number of tick-
ets as the other participant (1 D strongly disagree, 7 D strongly agree) and to
what extent they agree with the statement that they received less lottery tickets
than the other participant (1 D strongly disagree, 7 D strongly agree). To fur-
ther validate the manipulation of outcome, participants’ outcome fairness judg-
ments were solicited by asking participants how fair (1 D very unfair, 7 D
very fair), just (1 D very unjust, 7 D very just), appropriate (1 D very inap-
propriate, 7 D very appropriate), and justified (1 D very unjustified, 7 D very
justified) they considered their three lottery tickets. When the participants had
answered these questions, they were thoroughly debriefed and paid for their
participation.
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Results
Manipulation checks. A two-way multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) on the two manipulation checks of outcome (the equal-to-other check
and the worse-than-other check) yielded only a main effect of outcome at both the
multivariate level and the univariate levels: multivariate F(2, 95) D 79.59, p <
0.001; for the equal-to-other check, F(1, 96) D 137.89, p < 0.001; for the worse-
than-other check, F(1, 96)D 130.07, p< 0.001. Participants in the equal-to-other
condition agreed more with the statement that their number of lottery tickets was
equal to the number of tickets that the other participant received (MD 6.46, SDD
1.07) than participants in the worse-than-other condition (M D 2.32, SD D 2.23).
Participants in the worse-than-other condition agreed more with the statement that
they received less lottery tickets than the other participant (MD 5.54, SDD 2.31)
compared with participants in the equal-to-other condition (MD 1.36, SDD 1.17).
This indicates that outcome was successfully operationalized.
Similarly, participants’ outcome fairness judgments (outcome fairness, jus-
tice, appropriateness, and justification) yielded only a main effect of outcome at
both the multivariate level and the univariate levels: multivariate F(4, 93)D 81.38,
p< 0.001; for fairness judgments, F(1, 96)D 320.07, p< 0.001; for justice judg-
ments, F(1, 96) D 288.29, p < 0.001; for appropriateness judgments, F(1, 96) D
295.38, p < 0.001; for justification judgments, F(1, 96) D 272.41, p < 0.001. As
expected, participants who had received an outcome that was equal to the other
participant judged their outcome to be more fair (MD 6.02, SDD 1.19), just (MD
6.04, SDD 1.16), appropriate (MD 5.94, SDD 1.20), and justified (MD 5.88, SD
D 1.35) than participants who received an outcome that was worse than the other
participant’s outcome (Ms D 1.90, 2.04, 1.94, and 1.92, SDs D 1.09, 1.18, 1.11,
and 1.01, respectively). This yields corroborative evidence that the manipulation
of outcome was perceived as intended.
Comparability measures. As expected, participants’ comparability judgments
yielded no significant effects at both the multivariate level and the univariate levels.
Participants indicated that the other participant had performed equally well (M D
3.93, SD D 0.57) and was equally good in performing the tasks (M D 4.02, SD D
0.49). This shows that, as expected, participants thought of the other person as a
comparable person with respect to the tasks that were completed in the study (cf.
Van den Bos, 1999; Van den Bos, Lind, et al., 1997).
Dependent variable. Main dependent variable was the scale of participants’
affective reactions. We first performed a regression analysis on this dependent
variable to test for the predicted interaction effect between the centered (Aiken and
West, 1991) continuous affect intensity measure and the outcome manipulation
(dummy coded). As predicted, this yielded only two effects: a significant main
effect of outcome, fl D –0.50, p < 0.001, and a significant interaction effect, fl D
–0.19, p < 0.04. To test whether these effects corresponded with our predictions
(stronger effects of the outcome manipulation among participants high in affect
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Table 1. Mean Affective Ratings, Standard Deviations, and Number of Participants
as a Function of Affect Intensity and Outcome (Study 1)
Affect intensity
Low High
Outcome M SD n M SD n
Equal to other 5.41 0.76 25 5.51 1.01 25
Worse than other 4.59 1.19 25 3.82 1.29 25
Note. Means are on 7-point scales, with higher values indicating more positive
ratings of affect.
intensity than among those low in affect intensity), we had to calculate whether
the effects of the outcome manipulation were stronger among those high in affect
intensity than among those low in affect intensity. We calculated these simple main
effects of outcome in an ANOVA with the dichotomized affect intensity variable
and the outcome manipulation as independent variables.5 As expected, the ANOVA
yielded only two effects: a main effect of outcome, F(1, 96) D 33.73, p < 0.001,
and a significant interaction effect, F(1, 96) D 4.02, p < 0.05. The main effect of
outcome showed that affect ratings were more positive when participants received
an outcome that was equal to the outcome of the comparable other participant than
when their outcome was worse than the other’s outcome. More interestingly, this
effect was qualified by the interaction effect: As hypothesized, simple main effects
revealed that the effect of outcome was indeed stronger among participants high
in affect intensity, F(1, 98) D 28.31, p < 0.001, ·2 D 0.22, than among those low
in affect intensity, F(1, 98)D 5.49, p< 0.03, ·2 D 0.05. Table 1 shows the means,
standard deviations, and number of participants in each cell.
Finally, it can be noted here that participants’ scores on the continuous affect
intensity measure did not significantly influence their affect ratings within the
equal-to-other outcome conditions, fl D 0.08, ns, but did significantly influence
affect ratings within the worse-than-other outcome conditions, fl D –0.35, p <
0.02. We will come back to this in the General Discussion.
Discussion
As expected, it was found in Study 1 that especially people high in affect
intensity show strong affective reactions following the experience of outcome
5Please note that our hypothesis predicted stronger effects of the outcome manipulation among those
high in affect intensity than among those low in affect intensity, and not that the effects of affect
intensity would depend on particular levels of the outcome manipulation. Therefore, in order to test
our hypothesis precisely, it was important to calculate the effects of the outcome manipulation within
those high in affect intensity and within those low in affect intensity. We calculated these simple
main effects in the ANOVA procedure. Additionally, we will present the effects of affect intensity
as a function of the outcome conditions after the ANOVA and simple main effects results have been
presented.
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fairness. These are important findings because, as far as we know, they are the
first to show the moderating effects of individuals’ propensity for affect intensity
on affective reactions to experiences of fairness. Before strong conclusions on the
basis of these results were drawn, however, a second study was conducted.
STUDY 2
Because there are a number of different fairness constructs, it was impor-
tant to show that similar results can emerge across operationalizations. In Study
2, therefore, the fairness manipulation consisted of the most generally accepted
and best-documented manipulation in procedural justice studies (Brockner et al.,
1998; Folger, 1977; Folger et al., 1979; Van den Bos et al., 1997; Van den Bos
and Miedema, 2000). Participants either received or did not receive an opportunity
to voice their opinion about a decision. Before this manipulation of procedural
fairness, participants’ propensity for affect intensity was measured, and following
the manipulation of procedural fairness, participants’ affective reactions were as-
sessed. We predicted that affect ratings would be more positive when people had
received an opportunity to voice their opinion than when they had not received
such an opportunity. More interestingly, we hypothesized this procedure effect to
be stronger among people high in affect intensity than among those low in affect
intensity.
Method
Participants and design. Eighty-five students (16 men and 69 women) at
the Free University Amsterdam participated in the study and were paid for their
participation. The design was a 2 (affect intensity: high vs. low) £ 2 (procedure:
voice vs. no voice) between-subjects design. Participants were paid 10 Dutch
guilders for their participation.
Experimental procedure. The experimental procedure was the same as in
Study 1, except for the below-mentioned points. This time the Affect Intensity
Measure yielded an alpha of 0.90. Following Larsen et al. (1986, 1987), median
splits were used to classify participants as high in affect intensity or low in affect
intensity (Median D 3.88, SD D 0.51).
After participants had completed the practice and work rounds, they were
asked the same comparability questions that were measured in Study 1. This was
followed by the manipulation of procedure. In the voice condition, the supervisor of
the study allegedly asked participants, by means of the computer network, to type
in their opinion about the percentage of tickets that they should receive relative to
the other participant. Participants in the no-voice condition were informed that they
would not be asked to type their opinion about the percentage of tickets that they
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should receive relative to the other participant. (In reality, however, all stimulus
information was preprogrammed; an experimental procedure to which none of the
participants objected upon debriefing.)
This was followed by the assessment of the dependent variables and the ma-
nipulation checks. Main dependent variable was the same 16-item scale of affective
reactions toward fairness of experience that was used in Study 1 (fi D 0.74). Fol-
lowing previous procedural fairness studies, the manipulation of procedure was
checked by asking participants whether they thought they had received an op-
portunity to voice their opinion about the percentage of tickets that they should
receive relative to the other participant (1D strongly disagree, 7D strongly agree)
and to what extent they thought they had received an opportunity to voice their
opinion about the percentage of tickets that they should receive relative to the other
participant (1D very weak, 7D very strong). To further validate the manipulation
of procedure, participants’ procedural fairness judgments were assessed by asking
participants how fair (1 D very unfair, 7 D very fair), just (1 D very unjust, 7 D
very just), appropriate (1D very inappropriate, 7D very appropriate), and justified
(1 D very unjustified, 7 D very justified) they considered the way in which they
had been treated. When the participants had answered these questions, they were
thoroughly debriefed and paid for their participation.
Results
Manipulation checks. A two-way MANOVA on the two manipulation checks
of procedure yielded only a main effect of procedure at the multivariate level, F(2,
80)D 543.28, p< 0.001. Similarly, univariate analyses showed only a main effect
of procedure: Participants in the voice condition agreed more with the statement
that they had received an opportunity to voice their opinion (MD 6.42, SDD 0.93)
than participants in the no-voice condition (M D 1.31, SD D 0.52), F(1, 81) D
961.26, p < 0.001, and participants in the voice condition felt more strongly that
they had received an opportunity to voice their opinion (M D 6.05, SD D 0.98)
than those in the no-voice condition (M D 1.19, SD D 0.46), F(1, 81) D 837.88,
p < 0.001. This indicates that procedure was successfully operationalized.
Similarly, participants’ procedural fairness judgments (procedural fairness,
justice, appropriateness, and justification) yielded only a main effect of procedure
at both the multivariate level and the univariate levels: multivariate F(4, 78) D
32.39, p< 0.001; for fairness judgments, F(1, 81) D 90.39, p< 0.001; for justice
judgments, F(1, 81) D 127.72, p < 0.001; for appropriateness judgments, F(1,
81) D 76.94, p < 0.001; for justification judgments, F(1, 81) D 92.26, p < 0.001.
As expected, participants who had received an opportunity to voice their opinion
judged their procedure to be more fair (MD 5.56, SDD 0.98), just (MD 5.61, SD
D 0.76), appropriate (M D 5.37, SD D 0.95), and justified (M D 5.44, SD D
0.85) than those who received no such opportunity (Ms D 2.95, 2.92, 3.07,
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and 2.93, SDs D 1.48, 1.35, 1.42, and 1.47, respectively). This shows that the
manipulation of procedure was successful in affecting the relative strength of
participants’ procedural fairness judgments in ways that were intended with this
manipulation.
Comparability measures. As expected, participants’ comparability judgments
yielded no significant effects at both the multivariate level and the univariate levels.
Participants indicated that the other participant had performed equally well (M D
3.98, SD D 0.34) and was equally good in performing the tasks (M D 3.97, SD D
0.45). This shows that, as expected, participants thought of the other person as a
comparable person with respect to the tasks that were completed in the study.
Percentage findings. Participants who were allowed voice (n D 43) typed
in their opinion about the percentage tickets that they should receive relative to
the other participant. An ANOVA yielded no significant effect of affect intensity.
Inspection of the means indicated that participants typed in that the lottery tickets
should be divided equally between themselves and the other participant: Forty of
the participants answered that they should get 50% of the tickets, and the mean
percentage (M D 50.11%, SD D 2.31) did not differ from 50%. These findings
are supportive of equity theory: Participants preferred to divide outcomes equally
between themselves and the other participant (who contributed an equal amount
of inputs, and who hence deserved—according to equity theory—to receive the
same amount of outputs as the participants themselves).
Dependent variable. Main dependent variable was the scale of participants’
affective reactions. We first performed a regression analysis to test for the predicted
interaction effect between the centered continuous affect intensity measure and the
procedure manipulation (dummy coded). As hypothesized, this yielded only two
effects: a main effect of procedure,flD–0.34, p<0.01, and a significant interaction
effect, fl D –0.36, p< 0.001. To test whether these effects were in accordance with
our predictions (stronger effects of the procedure manipulation among participants
high in affect intensity than among those low in affect intensity), we had to calculate
whether the effects of the procedure manipulation were stronger among those high
in affect intensity than among those low in affect intensity. We calculated these
simple main effects of procedure in an ANOVA with the dichotomized affect
intensity variable and the procedure manipulation as independent variables. As
expected, the ANOVA yielded only two effects: a main effect of procedure, F(1,
81)D 11.00, p< 0.01, and a significant interaction effect, F(1, 81)D 8.37, p< 0.01.
The main effect of procedure showed that affect ratings were more positive when
participants had received an opportunity to voice their opinion than when they had
not received such an opportunity. More interestingly, this effect was qualified by
the interaction effect: As hypothesized, simple main effects revealed that the effect
of procedure was stronger among participants high in affect intensity than among
participants low in affect intensity. In fact, the procedure effect was statistically
significant among participants high in affect intensity, F(1, 83)D 19.91, p< 0.001,
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Table 2. Mean Affective Ratings, Standard Deviations, and Number of Participants
as a Function of Affect Intensity and Procedure (Study 2)
Affect intensity
Low High
Procedure M SD n M SD n
Voice 5.44 0.64 20 5.90 0.36 23
No voice 5.37 0.96 22 4.85 0.99 20
Note. Means are on 7-point scales, with higher values indicating more positive
ratings of affect.
and was not statistically significant among those low in affect intensity, F < 1.
Table 2 shows the means, standard deviations, and number of participants in each
cell.
It can also be noted here that participants’ scores on the continuous affect
intensity measure significantly influenced their affect ratings within both the voice
conditions, fl D 0.34, p< 0.03, and the no-voice conditions, fl D –0.45, p< 0.01.
We return to this below.
Discussion
As hypothesized, we found in Study 2 that especially people high in affect
intensity show strong affective reactions following the experience of procedural
fairness. Thus, together with the results of Study 1, the present paper reveals that
affect intensity moderates people’s affective reactions to experiences of fairness.
Furthermore, the studies reported here have shown that affect intensity can play
its moderating role on people’s reactions to both outcome fairness (Study 1) and
procedural fairness (Study 2).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The findings of the studies presented in this paper show that affective re-
actions following fair and unfair events are moderated by people’s propensity to
react strongly or mildly toward affect-eliciting events. Conducting two studies was
important because, although the studies differ to some extent, both yielded similar
results, helping to establish the robustness of the role of affect intensity in reactions
to fairness. Both studies that are reported here converge on the same point that it
is more likely that people high in affect intensity will show strong affective reac-
tions following the experience of fair and unfair events whereas those low in affect
intensity are more likely to show weaker affective reactions. These findings are
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important because they help to further social psychologists’ understanding of the
fact that affective reactions tend to appear less frequently and less strong than one
would expect (Cropanzano et al., 2000; Krehbiel and Cropanzano, 2000; Weiss
et al., 1999). The current findings specify when strong affective reactions are more
likely and when these reactions are less likely, and thus show that incorporating
affect intensity into the social justice literature may substantially further insights
into people’s reactions toward fairness. In fact, results suggest that there is a good
chance that in the case of low affect intensity weak or no effects of perceived fair-
ness on people’s reactions are to be found. This suggests that when affect intensity
is low, fairness—of which Folger (1984) argued that the importance of it cannot
be overstated—is in fact not so important.
A close inspection of the findings reported in this paper shows that in Study 2
individual differences in affect intensity significantly influenced affective reactions
within both the fair and unfair procedure conditions, indicating that individuals’
propensity for affect intensity can affect reactions to both fair and unfair events.
In Study 1, affect intensity significantly influenced affective reactions within the
unfair outcome conditions and not significantly within the fair outcome condi-
tions. Perhaps these differences have to do with the different constructs of fairness
that were explored here, with procedural fairness being more susceptible to the
moderating role of affect intensity on affective reactions than distributive fairness.
It should be noted here, however, that in both Studies 1 and 2, affect intensity
was more strongly associated with people’s affective reactions within the unfair
conditions (rs D –0.35 and –0.45, respectively) than within the fair conditions
(rs D 0.08 and 0.34, respectively). This is in correspondence with notions venti-
lated in the social justice literature that whereas we, scientists, tend to think and
talk about the psychology of justice, unjust events affect lay people’s cognitions
and reactions stronger than just events (e.g., Brockner and Wiesenfeld, 1996; Van
den Bos et al., 1997), suggesting that injustice plays an even more prominent
role than justice and that it might be more accurate to talk about the psychology
of injustice as opposed to justice (Folger, 1984; Folger and Cropanzano, 1998).
Furthermore, it is worthwhile to note here that there are other areas of research
within psychology (e.g., person perception) where negative information has been
found to have more impact on people’s reactions than positive information (e.g.,
Skowronski and Carlston, 1989). Future research on social justice and injustice
may profit from insights developed in these other areas of psychology.
An interesting aspect of the findings of Studies 1 and 2 is that they both
show strong interaction effects of affect intensity and fairness manipulations on
people’s affective reactions, but do not show interactions on fairness judgments.
This suggests that perceptions of fairness and justice are not influenced by in-
dividual differences in affect intensity, but that subsequent affective reactions to
the perception of fairness or unfairness are strongly influenced by affect intensity.
This emphasizes that it is important to distinguish perceptions of fairness from
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reactions following these perceptions. It is our impression that this subtle but
important distinction sometimes tends to be missed in the social psychological
literature on justice.
In the studies presented here we did not distinguish between positive and
negative affective reactions because we have found in our research that positive
and negative affective reactions to experiences of fairness are strongly inversely
correlated (e.g., Van den Bos, 2001a,b; Van den Bos and Lind, 2002; Van den
Bos and Miedema, 2000; Van den Bos and Spruijt, 2002; Van den Bos and Van
Prooijen, 2001). Thus, although other research areas—outside the justice domain—
have found strong differences between positive and negative affect, it was more
meaningful in the fairness studies presented here to study people’s combined af-
fective reactions toward experiences of fairness. Our findings have shown that on
these combined affective reactions strong interaction effects of affect intensity and
experiences of fairness could be found, indicating that the scale we used here to
measure affective feelings following fairness experiences was adequate.
Because it is not uncommon to find weak effects on affective reactions fol-
lowing the experience of fair and unfair events, we tried to set up our studies in such
a way that this would enhance the likelihood of finding the predicted effects. We
therefore reasoned that it made sense to use well-established experimental setups
that have been shown to have good levels of internal validity and experimental
realism and acceptable levels of ecological validity (Lind and Van den Bos, 2002;
Van den Bos, 1999; Van den Bos et al., 1997; Van den Bos and Lind, 2002). One
way we tried to enhance ecological validity and experimental realism was to use
stimulus materials that had real-life characteristics and that were important for our
participants (and debriefing interviews indicated that we were successful in this).
An advantage of the research methods we used here was that they provided us
with a high degree of control in setting up the kinds of situations we thought were
needed in this stage to successfully investigate affective reactions to fair and unfair
events. The findings that were presented here indeed do show the predicted effects
of affect intensity and fairness experiences on affective reactions.
Care must be taken, however, to generalize from the findings presented here
to other settings. Although we think it is reasonable to propose that our analysis of
the role of affect intensity in people’s reactions to fairness experiences is general-
izable to other social contexts and operationalizations, future research may want
to explore the generalizability of the effects reported here. However, the studies
presented here do show that particular effects may occur and do reveal the impor-
tant role that affect intensity may play in the psychology of affective reactions to
fair and unfair events. This may stimulate future research to explore other opera-
tionalizations and other research methods in other research settings. As research
accumulates concerning the antecedents of people’s reactions to fair and unfair
events, as it has in this study and in other studies (see, e.g., Brockner, Grover,
Reed, DeWitt, and O’Malley, 1987; Folger et al., 1979; Krehbiel and Cropanzano,
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2000; Lind, Kanfer, and Earley, 1990; Tyler, 1990; Weiss et al., 1999), we begin to
understand not only when reactions to experiences of fairness appear or disappear,
but also a great deal about why they occur at all and why they can be so potent when
they do occur. This knowledge in turn promises to advance our understanding of
the psychology of justice and of the role of justice-related phenomena in social
relations.
But, to return to the concept that motivated the research we report here,
the present paper fits into recent attempts to start exploring the role of affect in
social justice processes. Previous research suggested that moral transgressions
can lead people to show affective responses (e.g., Folger et al., 2001; Folger and
Baron, 1996; Folger and Skarlicki, 1998; Haidt, 2001, in press; Rozin et al., 1999)
and that fairness perceptions can influence discrete emotions (e.g., Krehbiel and
Cropanzano, 2000; Weiss et al., 1999). By revealing that individuals’ propensity
for affect intensity is an important determinant of how people react toward fair
and unfair events, the research presented in the current paper corroborates and
extends these previous studies as well as earlier research on affect intensity (e.g.,
Larsen et al., 1986, 1987). Thinking of justice as an affect-related construct is
important and may help to eventually better understand the controversy between
conceiving of justice judgments as subjective–affective concepts vs. as rational–
cognitive constructs (see Haidt, 2001; Van den Bos, 2002). The dynamic inter-
actionist approach used here (cf. Schmitt et al., 2003; Snyder and Cantor, 1998)
indicates that justice is an important issue but not for all people and hence that the
importance of justice can be overstated (cf. Folger, 1984). All this suggests that
incorporating the concept of affect intensity into the social psychological literature
on justice substantially furthers insights into people’s affective reactions toward
fairness.
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